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We develop the point of view where Quantum Mechanics results from the interplay between the
quantized number of “modalities” accessible to a quantum system, and the continuum of “contexts”
that are required to define these modalities. We point out the specific roles of “extracontextuality”
and “extravalence” of modalities, and relate them to the Kochen-Specker and Gleason theorems.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION.
During recent years a great number of convincing ex-
periments have vindicated beyond reasonable doubt the
violation of Bell’s inequalities [1–5], as well as of inequal-
ities derived from the Kochen-Specker theorem [6], and
of many variants of them [7]. These violations are most
often taken in a negative sense, as no-go results exclud-
ing the possibility of local and non-contextual hidden-
variable theories. One can thus conclude that hidden-
variable theories, if any, must be non-local and contex-
tual; an example is the de Broglie-Bohm theory [8].
From an empirical perspective, all the experiments
quoted above, as well as many others, are in perfect
agreement with quantum predictions, as well as with rel-
ativistic causality (or “no-signalling”), and no way to
access the hypothetical hidden-variables has ever been
found. Therefore in this paper we will attempt to make
one step further, and assume once for all that there are no
hidden-variables whatsoever behind quantum mechanics
(QM). If this is taken as an accepted fact, then what are
the consequences for quantum theory ?
In order to answer this question, we will follow the
route opened in [10, 11], by first forgetting the quantum
formalism, and restarting from physical considerations.
This approach will be illustrated by various examples,
until we meet again the mathematical description.
II. CONTEXTS, SYSTEMS, MODALITIES.
As a first step, we will consider a minimal set of
hypotheses, corresponding to a simple version of the
Kochen-Specker theorem [9], and which taken together
lead to a contradiction. By examining which of these
hypotheses might be given up, and how, we will get a
new set of hypotheses, escaping the previous contradic-
tion by using “extracontextuality”, a concept already
introduced in ref. [10]. We will show that this new set
of hypotheses is consistent with quantum experiments;
it may thus be used as a basis to tell what quantum
objects really are. Again in agreement with previous
work [11], our conclusion will be that a quantum object,
able to carry fully predictable and repeatable properties
called modalities, must involve both a system and a
context.
Let us now recapitulate qualitatively a few definitions,
that have been written down more formally in [10, 11],
and are summarized by the acronym CSM (Contexts,
Systems, Modalities).
• A system is an entity of the natural world that can
be isolated well enough to carry physical properties
with definite values, such as mass, position, angular
momentum...
• These physical properties can be measured using
apparatus external to the system. The completely
specified measurement device is called a context,
and is defined within the framework of classical
physics, as it is done in any experiment.
These definitions of systems and contexts are valid both
in classical and quantum physics, but classically the con-
text can be regarded as a tool, allowing one to measure
physical properties which are then carried by the system
alone. However, this is no more true in quantum physics,
where we posit the following axioms, built up from em-
pirical evidence :
• Axiom 1 : In quantum mechanics physical prop-
erties can be measured repeatedly, and the results
can be predicted with certainty, as long as both the
system and the context are kept the same. The set
of definite (fully predictable) values of the physi-
cal properties is called a modality, and it belongs
jointly to the system and the context.
• Axiom 2 : Within a context, there are N mutu-
ally exclusive modalities, where N depends on the
system but is the same in all relevant contexts.
• Axiom 3 : The (classical) parameters defining the
context can be varied continuously and reversibly;
they may be e.g. the orientation of a polarizer, or
the position of a detector.
As a summary, the “quantum object” carrying fully pre-
dictable physical properties is the indivisible association
of a system and a context (Axiom 1), and these physical
properties are quantized (Axiom 2) in any context chosen
within a continuous range (Axiom 3).
In the following we will illustrate these ideas using
three examples, which all fit within the CSM framework,
but illustrate various aspects, related to quantum inter-
ferences in section 3, to Bell’s inequalities in section 4
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2and to Kochen-Specker contextuality in section 5. The
reader may prefer one of these illustrations or the other,
depending on his/her own background.
We note that our objective here is not to look for more
no-go theorems, but to exploit definitions related to our
CSM version of quantum ontology [11] and deduce the
QM formalism from them [10]. So to be clear we will use
different words like extracontextuality, extravalence (i.e.
equivalence with respect to extracontextuality), keeping
in mind that we are working in the CSM ontological
framework [11], different from the usual (classical) one.
III. EXTRAVALENCE OF MODALITIES IN AN
INTERFEROMETRIC TOY MODEL.
We consider first a simple (but idealized) experiment,
and impose some requirements on it, which would obvi-
ously be verified by an actual set-up, up to some techni-
cal imperfections. So let us consider a quantum particle
(system) propagating in a set of N transmission lines
(context), see Fig. 1. For instance, it may be a photon
in an array of N parallel optical fibers.
FIG. 1: Various contexts corresponding to one quantum parti-
cle (system) moving along 4 transmissions lines. After chang-
ing context (mixing the lines), a new modality is defined by
a non-destructive detection (blue box). The different modal-
ities connected by the thick green line are extravalent, i.e.
connected with certainty through the contexts 1, 2 and 3.
A. Toy model for context, system, modalities.
In this toy model there is one particle only, i.e. if one
looks at all lines, one gets one “click” only, which tells
in which line the particle is, and all possible clicks are
mutually exclusive. This corresponds to the fundamental
quantization postulate that we introduced in axiom 2.
This measurement can be done in a destructive way (by
cutting the array of lines and putting a detector on each
one), but more interestingly in a non-destructive way, i.e.
the click can be obtained without extracting the particle
from the array. The non-destructive measurement gives
always one click, and the line in which it occurs is certain
and repeatable, as long as the context is not changed, in
agreement with axiom 1.
The possible results are defined as the modalities
corresponding to our system, and are certain, repeatable,
and mutually exclusive provided that there is no change
in the context. A given modality is thus considered to
belong jointly to the system (the particle) and to the
context (a given array of transmission lines).
B. Extravalence and extracontextuality.
Then one may change the context by mixing the lines
in the array (Fig.1). The most obvious way to do this is
by permutation, and then one can follow each modality,
and guarantee the certainty by simply rearranging the
various modalities (or transmission lines).
Since the context has (physically) changed after the
permutation, we will not say that the modalities are the
same (because a modality is associated with a context),
but as the certainty is maintained, one can say that this
certainty is transferred from one modality to the other.
This is clearly an equivalence relation : certainty is trans-
ferred from one modality to itself (in the case where the
context remains the same), and the relation is symmetric
and transitive between contexts. This equivalence rela-
tion by certainty transfer will be called “extravalence”.
Though straightforward in the previous example,
the existence of extravalence classes relating modalities
in different contexts is by no mean obvious, but it
is fully compatible with our postulates. We call this
“extracontextuality”.
C. Probabilities when changing contexts.
In general, the change of context is not simply a permu-
tation, but can involve any mixing of all the lines, like on
the right side of Fig. 1. According to axiom 2, after this
mixing there are alwaysN lines, and the (unique) particle
cannot be lost. In addition, different modalities belong-
ing to the same extravalence class are connected with
certainty (i.e. with probability p = 1) when changing
the context. Therefore the N mutually exclusive modal-
ities in context C1 correspond to N mutually exclusive
extravalence classes, and the same is true for context C2.
One may thus ask the question: given the modality
(line) ui in context C1, what modality (line) vj will be
found in context C2 ? If a modality vj can be identified
with certainty for any other context C2, given ui, this
may mean different things:
- there is always a deterministic link between the con-
texts, like for the permutation in Fig. 1. But then one
has always the same N mutually exclusive alternatives,
and the context can be forgotten. In such a case the
modality can be identified with its extravalence class, and
attributed to the system alone, like in classical physics.
- there exists a (possibly hidden) context specifying
modalities in both contexts C1 and C2. But such a con-
text would have more than N mutually exclusive modali-
ties, in contradiction with axiom 2. For clarity, let us note
that extravalent modalities taken from different contexts
cannot be put together to increase the number of modal-
ities within the same context: this would also contradict
axiom 2 since only mutually exclusive modalities should
appear in the same context. This argument is closely
connected to the Kochen-Specker theorem, that will be
discussed in the next section.
So in the general case, contextual quantization requires
that given modality ui in context C1, only the probabil-
ity to get modality vj in context C2 can be given by the
3theory. This reasoning leads also to the crucial idea that
probabilities are not defined between individual modal-
ities, but between extravalent classes of modalities; we
will come back to this in section 5.
IV. TWO SPIN 1/2 PARTICLES AND BELL’S
INEQUALITIES.
Another example with N = 4 is given by two spin 1/2
particles, with spin operators ~S1 = (Sx1, Sy1, Sz1) and
~S2 = (Sx2, Sy2, Sz2). Using standard ket notations and
~ = 1, the four mutually exclusive modalities when mea-
suring (Sz1, Sz2) are |m1 = ±1/2,m2 = ±1/2〉 = |±,±〉.
But instead of the separated context (Sz1, Sz2), one
may use use the joint context (~S2, Sz), where ~S = ~S1+ ~S2
is the total spin of the two particles. In agreement with
N = 4, and still using standard Dirac notations, one has
again four mutually exclusive modalities, associated with
the quantum numbers S and mS , and the kets are related
to the previous ones in the following way :
|S = 1,mS = +1〉 = |+,+〉
|S = 1,mS = −1〉 = |−,−〉
|S = 1,mS = 0〉 = (|+,−〉+ |−,+〉)/
√
2
|S = 0,mS = 0〉 = (|+,−〉 − |−,+〉)/
√
2〉
It is clear that the ket |S = 1,mS = 1〉 when measuring
(S2, Sz) is the same as |+,+〉 when measuring (Sz1, Sz2),
same for |S = 1,mS = −1〉 and |−,−〉. However, the two
contexts are clearly different, and therefore the modali-
ties are also different, but the certainty in one context is
fully transferred to a certainty in the other context: the
modalities are thus extravalent.
In a Bell scenario, one prepares the two spins in an en-
tangled modality, e.g. the singlet state |S = 0,mS = 0〉,
and then one moves to the context (Sz1, Sz2) with sep-
arable modalities |±,±〉. Then the results are necessary
random, but they are correlated between Alice (with spin
~S1) and Bob (with spin ~S2). The usual question is to ask
what happens at Bob’s remote place, when Alice per-
forms a measurement on her particle. The answer is ob-
viously that nothing happens at Bob’s, who is very far
away. Nevertheless, from her measurement Alice per-
fectly knows the modality for Bob’s particle, but in her
context, and this can only be verified at a later time
by bringing together Alice’s context and Bob’s particle.
Therefore we do have quantum non-locality - due to the
bipartite context+system nature of the modality - but
not action or even influence at a distance.
Such a situation would never occur in classical physics,
where each system is believed to carry its own property:
it is thus clear that local realism fails, as demonstrated
by Bell’s theorem, and it fails both ways: both classical
realism and classical locality fail, for the same reason that
the modality belongs to both the context and the system
(see [15] for more details).
It is thus possible to conclude the famous Einstein-
Bohr debate [5], by writing “If, without in any way dis-
turbing a system, neither changing the context, we can
predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to
unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there ex-
ists an element of physical reality corresponding to this
physical quantity.” This fits with Einstein’s conception of
reality, while adding a Bohrian twist: a quantum system
must be permanently associated with a classical context.
V. EXTRACONTEXTUALITY IN THE
KOCHEN-SPECKER THEOREM
A. Bell-Kochen-Specker-Cabello theorem.
A third way to illustrate our axioms is using the frame-
work of the Kochen-Specker theorem as presented by Ca-
bello [9]. A possible measurement set-up, i.e. a context,
corresponds to a column in Fig. 2, and for each context
there are N=4 mutually exclusive modalities: if one of
them is true, or realized, the 3 other ones are wrong, or
not realized.
FIG. 2: Configuration for the Bell-Kochen-Specker-Cabello
theorem, with 9 contexts (columns) and 4 mutually exclusive
modalities per context. Each of the 18 colored boxes [16] as-
sociated with modalities is repeated twice, and if a modality
is true (realized) in one context, it is automatically true also
in the other context where it appears. According to our def-
initions, the modalities Mi and M
′
i (with the same number
and color) are not identical, but are extravalent.
In Fig. 2 there are 9 different contexts, with the pecu-
liar feature that some modalities (with the same color)
are shared between two contexts. This means in practice
that if a modality is true in one context, it is automat-
ically true also in the other context where it appears,
though the measurement itself may be different; accord-
ing to our definitions, two modalities with the same color
are extravalent. We note that axiom 3 is not fulfilled here,
because there is only a finite number of contexts; we will
come back to this later.
By definition a non-contextual hidden variable theory
should obey the following rules :
1/ one and only one modality can be true for each
context
2/ if a modality is true in one context, it must also
be true in any other context where it appears (or more
correctly according to CSM: if a modality is true in one
4context, another modality in the same extravalence class
must also be true in any other context where it appears)
3/ any possible modality must be either true (realized)
or wrong (not realized).
Then from 1/ and 3/, 9 slots must be marked true,
i.e. one for each context. In addition, from 2/ and 3/,
an even number of slots must be marked true. But 9 is
not even, so the three rules cannot hold together. This is
the essence of the Kochen-Specker theorem, establishing
that there is no non-contextual hidden variable theory.
On the other hand QM can deal quite well with the
situation of Fig. 1, so it must disagree with at least one
of the three rules, and it is interesting to ask which one :
1/ one cannot give up rule 1, because a measurement
gives one result among four mutually exclusive ones, this
is our second (empirically founded) axiom.
2/ one cannot give up rule 2, because the certainty of a
modality can be transferred from one context to another,
as required by extracontextuality.
3/ therefore one must give up rule 3, i.e. the require-
ment to give simultaneous truth values to all modalities.
This is quite acceptable, since we already know that prob-
abilities are needed, as an unavoidable consequence of our
axioms 1 (modalities) and 2 (quantization) [10, 11].
B. Extravalence and extracontextuality (again).
The next question is what should replace the previous
rule 3: this is where extravalence comes in. First let
rule 2 be restated in the following way : if a modality is
certain in one context, all extravalent modalities are also
certain in any other context where they appear.
But this appears as a particular case of the following
more general rule : given a modality in an extravalence
class, the probability p to get any other possible modality
in another extravalence class when changing the context
depends only on the two extravalence classes, and not
on the contexts in which the modalities are embedded.
Clearly rule 2 is just a particular case where p = 1, and
it can be superseded by this more general rule, which
fits with the contextual objectivity of modalities [12]: a
context is always needed for a modality to show up, but
modalities are extracontextual, i.e. their certainty and
reproducibility can be transferred between contexts.
One can thus consider the following rules for extracon-
textuality:
I / the N modalities within one context are mutually
exclusive, and their probabilities sum to 1: if one is real-
ized (p = 1), all other ones are not (p = 0).
II / given a modality ui within a context, the probabil-
ity to get any other modality vj within another context
depends only on the extravalence classes of these two
modalities, and not on their embedding contexts.
It should be obvious that these two rules agree with
quantum empirical evidence. The question we will con-
sider now is whether these rules are strong enough to
deduce the formalism of quantum mechanics, which has
not been used so far, except as a reference or example.
VI. GLEASON’S THEOREM.
A crucial feature of the extracontextuality rules given
above is that they can be seen as the physical content
of the hypotheses needed to derive Gleason’s theorem
[13, 14]. Let us remind here a statement of this theorem:
Let f(Pi) be a function of rank-one projectors Pi in a
real or complex Hilbert space with a dimension larger than
2, to the interval [0,1] of real numbers. Let assume that∑
i f(Pi) = 1 for any set {Pi} of mutually orthogonal
projectors (i.e. PiPj = Piδij) verifying
∑
i Pi = 1ˆ. Then
there is a unique positive Hermitian operator ρ with unit
trace so that f(Pi) = Tr(ρPi) for all Pi.
For our purpose, it is useful to consider the particular
case where f(Pi) can reach the value 1 for some projector
Pk. Then Tr(ρPk) = 1, but this implies that ρ = Pk, i.e.
ρ is itself a projector [18].
So if we assume that each extravalent class is bijec-
tively associated with a N ×N Hermitian rank-one pro-
jector Pi, i.e. P
†
i = P
2
i = Pi, and that each set of N
mutually exclusive modalities is associated to a set of N
mutually orthogonal projectors, then one gets
* (from rule II): given an initial modality, the proba-
bility f(Pi) to get a final modality associated with Pi is
a function of the rank-one projector Pi
* (from rule I): for any set {Pi} of mutually orthogonal
projectors verifying
∑
i Pi = 1ˆ, one has
∑
f(Pi) = 1
These are just the hypotheses needed for the theorem.
As it is well-known, an essential assumption in Gleason’s
theorem is that f(Pi) does not depend on other modali-
ties (or projectors) associated with Pi to set up a context,
as required by rule II.
This assumption is sometimes called non-contextuality
(of probability assignments), but this terminology is mis-
leading with respect to the Kochen-Specker theorem, as
it suggests the contradictory claims that QM is both con-
textual, and non-contextual. Using our terminology it is
neither, but it is extracontextual. In order to clarify this
point, let us give some examples:
* a non-contextual theory is one where reproducible
properties of systems can be defined independently of
any context, or equivalently in a single universal context,
so that a system owns its physical properties. This is
typically the case of classical mechanics, and it is also
deeply embedded in the hypotheses of Bell’s theorem.
Clearly this fails in quantum mechanics
* a contextual theory is one where the working frame-
work (in which the results are defined) has to be changed
each time the context is changed; in addition, given Bell’s
theorem, this change has to be non-local and instanta-
neous in order to agree with experiments. There are
many variants of contextual theories, either with hidden
variables (e.g. de Broglie - Bohm theory), or without, but
it is clear that some degree of contextuality is required
to agree with QM and experiments.
As said above, QM is none of that: it is not non-
contextual because contexts are required to define modal-
5ities, but it is not contextual like a hidden-variable theory
would be, requiring instantaneous influence or action-at-
a-distance. This is made clear in our approach, by requir-
ing instead that the object carrying properties is a system
within a context [15]. In addition, extracontextuality as-
serts that the certainty of modalities can be carried out
between contexts; this has stringent consequences on the
way to calculate quantum probabilities.
VII. THE CSM PROOF: STOCHASTIC AND
UNISTOCHASTIC MATRICES.
According to the above section, the extracontextuality
rules fit very well with Gleason’s theorem, and allow us
to recover Born’s rule. But clearly the major required
hypothesis is that each extravalence class is bijectively
associated with a N × N Hermitian rank-one projector
Pi; would it be possible to avoid this assumption ?
A way for doing that has been presented in [10], and
relies on a specific decomposition of the N ×N matrix Π
giving the probability pj|i to end up in modality vj of con-
text {vj}, starting from modality ui of context {ui}. We
note that pj|i is not a conditional probability according
to the usual (Bayesian) definition, since “ui and vj” is in
general not a modality, and cannot be given a truth value
0 or 1. Since all the probabilities starting from a given
ui sum to one, the matrix Π is said to be a stochastic
matrix. But according to Born’s rule, it should be unis-
tochastic [10], i.e. made from the square moduli of the
coefficients of a unitary matrix; this is what we want to
show. In order to get this result we demonstrated the
following Lemmas [10]:
Lemma 1: The elements pj|i of a N × N stochastic
matrix can be written under the general form
pj|i = Tr
(
P ′i R P
′′
j R
)
(1)
where {P ′i} and {P ′′j } are two sets of N hermitian pro-
jectors of dimension N ×N , mutually orthogonal within
each set, and where R is a real nonnegative N ×N diag-
onal matrix such that Tr(R2) = N , and Tr(P ′i R
2) = 1
for all projectors P ′i within {P ′i}.
Lemma 2: If R = 1ˆ then the matrix Π is unistochastic
(the reciprocal is not true).
Though N × N hermitian projectors show up in
Lemma 1, there is nothing quantum yet, since this for-
mula applies (in a non unique way) to any given stochas-
tic matrix Π. In particular, R depends on the particular
Π being considered, which is generally not unistochastic.
The main issue is then to show that R = 1ˆ for all pairs
of contexts, so that eq. 1 turns into Born’s rule.
This can be obtained by assuming that pj|i takes the
specific form:
pj|i = Tr(P ′u˜i Ru˜i,v˜j P
′′
v˜j Ru˜i,v˜j ). (2)
where u˜i (resp. v˜j) is the extravalence class associated
with ui (resp. vj). This equation appears as a conse-
quence of rule II, i.e. that given a modality ui within
a context, the probability to get any other modality vj
within another context depends only on the extravalence
classes of these two modalities, and not on their embed-
ding contexts. From the parametization of eq. 1, R is
fixed for a given pair of contexts containing respectively
ui and vj , and eq. 2 adds the extra constraint that it is
also fixed for a given pair of extravalence classes u˜i and
v˜j , whatever the embedding contexts. Then it can be
shown (see [10] or Appendix below) that R = 1ˆ for all
pairs of contexts, and Born’s rule follows since one has
pj|i = Tr(P ′ui P
′′
vj ).
It may be useful to compare this reasoning with Glea-
son’s theorem:
* Gleason’s theorem first associates each modality vj
with a projector Pvj acting in the Hilbert space R
N or
CN . Then it looks for f(Pvj ), with
∑
j f(Pvj ) = 1 for
any set of N orthogonal projectors such that
∑
j Pvj = 1ˆ,
and it concludes that f(Pvj ) is continuous, and is given
by Born’s formula Tr(Pui Pvj ), where Pui is the projector
associated with the initial modality ui.
* The CSM proof exploits a generic form of stochastic
matrices as a Trace depending on projectors, which is
valid generally even outside QM, as long as R 6= 1ˆ. Then
it uses extracontextuality as expressed by eq. 2, and
also continuity of the changes of contexts, in order to get
Born’s formula and the quantum formalism.
So the two approaches start from different sides, but
deal with the same issue of getting an extracontextual
probability law, and they eventually come to the same
conclusion, i.e. Born’s rule. This clearly shows that,
though Gleason’s theorem is often said to be pure math-
ematics without physical content, the CSM approach pro-
vides it with a well-grounded physical basis.
VIII. TAKE-HOME MESSAGE.
The main purpose of this article is to provide another
view on the abstract reasoning of [10], giving it some
flesh by starting from the exemple of idealized thought-
experiments. This allows one to better understand the
meaning of CSM, and also of extracontexuality and ex-
travalence. Maybe it is worth again emphasizing that
in our approach there is nothing like a “wave function”,
universal or not. The real physical objects are the com-
binations of a system and a context, and these objects
can be given objective (certain, reproducible) properties
called modalities. Contextual quantization (axiom 2) im-
plies that modalities are related probabilistically between
different contexts, and the QM formalism is a mathemat-
ical way to calculate these probabilities.
As a take-home message, the modality is a real phe-
nomenon involving a system and a context as physical
objects, and it should be carefully distinguished from the
6state vector or projector, which is a mathematical object,
associated to a class of extravalent modalities. Mixing up
these two notions generates a lot of confusion, that may
easily be avoided in our approach [19].
IX. APPENDIX
In this appendix we include some missing pieces in the
demonstration that R = 1ˆ; this is a summary adapted
from [10]. As explained above, we look for stochastic ma-
trices connecting probabilities between any two contexts,
because stochasticity is a minimum requirement for con-
sistency of probabilities in our approach. Then we use
the general parametrization of lemma 1, involving two
sets of orthogonal projectors and a diagonal matrix R.
If the two contexts are the same, then the stochastic
matrix is 1ˆ, and from its definition R = 1ˆ also. Therefore
an arbitrary set of mutually orthogonal projectors can be
associated with the context, with one (rank 1) projector
associated with each modality. We note that the projec-
tors are still undefined at that stage, it is only required
that they make an orthogonal set.
Then one goes from this initial context C1 to another
context C2 with some stochastic matrix, and adjust the
initial projectors to fit with the parametrization using the
R matrix, which is given for two given contexts. Then
one can sum the expression of Lemma 1 over the modal-
ities of C2, and from the normalization conditions of the
stochastic matrix Tr(P ′u˜i R
2
u˜i,v˜j
) = 1 and of the projec-
tor Tr(P ′u˜i) = 1 one gets a set of homogeneous linear
equations
Tr(P ′u˜i (R
2
u˜i,v˜j − 1ˆ)) = 0 (3)
where the unknowns are the N diagonal coefficients of
(R2u˜i,v˜j − 1ˆ), and the coefficients depend on the set of
projectors associated with the extravalence class in the
initial context. If R2u˜i,v˜j 6= 1ˆ, the determinant of this set
of equations must be zero, which amounts to a condition
on the set of projectors {P ′u˜n} associated with the initial
context {un}.
Now make a small change in the initial context {un},
keeping the reference modality ui constant. By continu-
ity, this amounts to changing the projectors except one,
and R should not change. But this is clearly impossi-
ble: if the projectors change except one (which requires
d ≥ 3), the determinant of eq. 3 will not be zero any
more; and even if the changes are restricted so that the
determinant remains zero, the set of (degenerate) equa-
tions will change, and R cannot remain the same, unless
R = 1ˆ. This reasoning can be done for any initial modal-
ity and context, so R = 1ˆ for any initial context, and thus
for any pair of contexts. Therefore the stochastic matri-
ces become unistochastic, which was the crucial point to
be demonstrated.
Assuming from now that R = 1ˆ between any pair of
contexts, the set of initial projectors can be freely chosen
(choice of a fiducial basis), and what actually matters
are the unitary matrices connecting the sets of mutually
orthogonal projectors associated with the different possi-
ble contexts. These unitary matrices have to be complex
to continuously connect all permutations to the identity
matrix [10]. For consistency of the construction one also
gets that the unitary matrix connecting two contexts in
reverse order is the inverse unitary matrix, and thus the
“reverse” probability matrix is the transposed one, which
was not obvious from the start.
Coming back to the thought-experiment of Fig. 1, and
considering that the lines are optical fibers, one gets arbi-
trary change in context by connecting pairs of lines using
arbitrary beam-splitters, with suitable complex reflection
and transmission coefficients. It was shown in [17] that
any unitary transformation can be reconstructed in this
way. Therefore the “mapping” of physical vs. mathemat-
ical changes in the contexts is particularly simple here,
but this is not always the case.
One may also wonder what happens with the scheme of
Fig. 2 with only 9 contexts, where Gleason’s or CSM the-
orems cannot be used due to the lack of continuity. The
simplest way to solve this issue it to consider that, ac-
cording to our physically-based axiom 3, the discrete set
of contexts must be embedded in a continuous set; then
the previous proofs are applicable again. This follows
the CSM idea that the quantum formalism results from
the interplay between the quantized number of modali-
ties accessible to a quantum system, and the continuum
of contexts that are required to define these modalities.
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